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I

1

n the July 1973 issue of the Journal, there appeared an article with the above
title written by Professor Richard Falk, in which he, in effect, advanced the
thesis that the release of prisoners of war for repatriation during the course of
hostilities in Vietnam to an ad hoc and self-styled "humanitarian organization"
(which admittedly consisted solely of individuals who were vocal opponents of
the United States participation in those hostilities) either constituted a valid and
forward-looking interpretation of the provisions of the Geneva Convention of
2
1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar (hereinafter referred to as
"the 1949 Convention") or indicated the need for revision of that instrument.
The subject appears to be one which calls for an analysis in considerably greater
depth than the treatment provided in the article by Professor Falk.
In this article, I shall discuss, independently of the facts alleged and the
arguments advanced in the article by Professor Falk, the legal aspects involved
in (1) the release and repatriation during the course of hostilities of prisoners of
war who do not come within the mandatory provisions of Article 109 et seq. of
the 1949 Convention (in other words, those who are not so "seriously
wounded" or so "seriously sick" as to be entitled to release and repatriation as
a matter of right); and (2) the use of an "impartial humanitarian organization"
to accomplish this purpose. Thereafter, I shall point out some of the areas in
which I agree or disagree with the proponent of this procedure.

II
Historically, there have been three major methods employed by Detaining
Powers for the release and repatriation during the course of hostilities of
able-bodied prisoners of war-ransom, exchange, and parole. The ransom of
captured military personnel, which reached its peak in its application to chivalry
'" Reprinted in THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 340 (Richard Falk
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in medieval times, had, for all practical purposes, disappeared by the end of the
3
seventeenth century. It was replaced by exchange when continental annies
became national and professional and when obtaining the release of captured
military personnel became accepted as the responsibility of the sovereign.
Exchange was man-for-man and grade-for-grade (with tables of "equivalent
values") so that, at least in theory, it would not result in any change in the relative
4
military strengths of the two sides. Exchange still existed as late as the American
Civil War, but it ceased to be a really effective procedure during that conflict.5
Parole is the third method of effectuating the release and repatriation of
prisoners of war during the course of hostilities. Under this procedure, the
prisoner of war agrees to certain conditions that will govern his conduct upon
his release from a confined status. It has proven relatively unimportant as a
method of procuring the release and repatriation of prisoners of war during the
course of a conflict. Historically, it developed primarily into a method of
pennitting the prisoner of war more freedom within the territory of the
Detaining Power, rather than of procuring his release and repatriation. 6
Moreover, Article 21(2) of the 1949 Convention, like its predecessors,
specifically contemplates that Powers of Origin may prohibit their captured
military personnel from giving or accepting parole; a number of countries,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, have traditionally
restricted the right of their military personnel to give or accept parole?
Article 72 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 Relative to the Treatment of
8
Prisoners ofWar (hereinafter referred to as "the 1929 Convention") suggested
the possibility of agreements between belligerents for the repatriation during
hostilities of "able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period
of captivity." A similar but somewhat more extensive provision was included
in the 1949 Convention. Article 109(2) provides that the Parties may "conclude
agreements with a view to the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral
country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of
captivity.,,9 This provision may be considered as an attempt to encourage the
belligerents to adopt one of these procedures (and to give neutral states and
others a basis for proposing them), rather than as a legal authorization to do so,
inasmuch as no such authorization was needed in order to enable belligerents
lawfully to enter into such agreements. Article 6(1) of the 1949 Convention
specifically contemplates the conclusion of special agreements by the Parties
concerning prisoner-of-war matters, subject only to the limitations that any such
agreement may not "adversely affect" the prisoners of war to whom it purports
to apply and that it may not "restrict the rights" elsewhere conferred upon them
by the Convention. Paragraph 2 of the same article contemplates that a Party
may unilaterally give prisoners of war more favorable treatment than is required
by the 1949 Convention itself Certainly, an agreement for the repatriation of
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longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war during the course of hostilities would
not fall within the ambit of either of the limitations mentioned above; 10 and it
would in any event be more favorable treatment than required by the 1949
Convention. 11 Moreover, the Detaining Power could justifiably assert that
individuals so repatriated would be barred from further participation in the
. .It. 12
h os tili··
Iles agaInst
Unfortunately, despite the fact that World War II saw many prisoners of war
held in captivity for periods in excess of five years, apparently no belligerent
sought to implement Article 72 of the 1929 Convention. 13 And in none of the
many armed conflicts which have occurred since the end of World War II (and
since the 1949 Convention became effective) has there been an agreement for
the repatriation of able-bodied prisoners of war prior to the cessation of
hostilities. 14 However, it is not really difficult to understand why neither of the
substantially similar provisions of the two Prisoner-of-War Conventions has ever
been implemented by belligerents. Any bilateral agreement providing for the
repatriation during hostilities of able-bodied prisoners of war would merely be
a new name for the old procedure of exchange, a procedure which fell into
disuse because, despite its man-for-man and grade-for-grade aspects, it inevitably
turned out to be more advantageous for one side than for the other. is Indeed,
this same factor has even militated against the repatriation during the course of
hostilities of seriously wounded or sick prisoners of war. 16
It being accepted that releases and repatriations during the course ofhostilities
of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war are within the contemplation of
existing intemationallaw, despite the failure of any belligerent state to do so as
a matter ofpractice, let us move to the next problem. What are the qualifications
required of a body for it to fall within the category of organizations empowered
to perform the humanitarian functions which the 1949 Convention authorizes
for the benefit of prisoners of war?
Article 8 ofthe 1949 Convention is the basic article establishing the Protecting
Power with its manifold humanitarian and other functions. 17 However, Article
9 of that Convention specifically provides that humanitarian activities for the
benefit of prisoners of war may also be performed by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (the ICRC) or by "any other impartial
humanitarian organization." The organization and operations of the ICRC are
widely known and have received well-merited recognition throughout the 1949
Convention. is The precise nature of the organizations which fall within the
meaning of the term "any other impartial humanitarian organization" is
considerably less clear.
Article 88 ofthe 1929 Convention, which was the direct progenitor ofArticle
9 of the 1949 Convention, did not include the possibility of the intervention of
any "humanitarian organization" other than the ICRC for the purpose of
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furnishing assistance to prisoners of war. That possibility received recognition
for the first time in a proposal made by the Italian representative during a meeting
of a committee of the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1949
19
Convention. The Italian proposal to add the words "or any other impartial
humanitarian body" after the reference to the ICRC in the original draft of the
article received the strong support of the Director-General of the International
Refugee Organization (IRO) who pointed out that, in view of the existing
collaboration between governments and the IRO, "it would seem opportune
to extend the provisions ofArticle 8 [now Article 9 of the 1949 Prisoner-of-War
Convention], to enable governments to avail themselves of its services in case
of necessity.,,20 The proposal was adopted by the Joint Committee of the
Diplomatic Conference after a debate in which the representative of the United
States had supported the use for humanitarian purposes of "welfare organizations
of a non-international character" and the Committee had rejected a Burmese
proposal to narrow the Italian rroposal to "any other internationally recognized
impartial humanitarian body.,,2 It was a~proved at a Plenary Meeting of the
2
Diplomatic Conference without debate.
The foregoing is the substance of the travaux preparatoires concerning the
addition of the words "or any other impartial humanitarian organization" to
Article 9 of the 1949 Convention?3 In attempting to elucidate the precise
meaning of these words, itis therefore necessary to look elsewhere for help. The
ICRC's discussion of the matter in a 1960 publication is extremely helpful.
The humanitarian activities authorized must be undertaken by the International
Committee of the Red Cross or by any other impartial humanitarian organization.
The International Committee is mentioned in two capacities-firstly on its own
account . . . ; and secondly, as an example of what is meant by "impartial
humanitarian organization.... "
The organization must be humanitarian; in other words it must be concerned with
the condition of man, considered solely as a human being, regardless of his value
as a military, political, professional or other unit. It must also be impartial. Article
9 does not require it to be international .... Furthermore, the Convention does not
require the organization to be neutral, but it is obvious that impartiality benefits
greatly from neutrality.
In order to be authorized, the organization's activities must be purely humanitarian
in character; that is to say they must be concerned with human beings as such,
and must not be affected by any political or military consideration. Within those
limits, any subsidiary activity which helps to implement the principles of the
Convention is not only authorized but desirable under Article 9... .24
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There are, then, three basic requirements for an organization's qualifying as
"any other impartial humanitarian organization" within the meaning of Article
9 of the 1949 Convention: first, it must be impartial in its operations; second, it
must be humanitarian in concept and function; and third, it must have some
25
institutional, operational, and functional resemblance to the ICRC. Negatively,
it need not be international in creation and it need not be neutral in origin.
What is meant by "impartial"? An "impartial" organization is one which, as
an institution, is unbiased and unprejudiced, fair and equitable to both sides in
its operations, one which neither by act nor by statement gives any indication
26
that it prefers one side over the other. The mere fact ofbeing established and
based in a neutral country does not ofitself make an organization "impartial. ,,27
Conversely, the mere fact of being established and based in a belligerent country
does not necessarily indicate a lack of "impartiality. " While, as a practical matter,
it will undoubtedly be most difficult to identifY an organization which is not
"neutral" in location but which is accepted as "impartial," this is neither a
paradox nor an impossibility. Such an organization will usually be one which
operates exclusively in the territory of its own nation, preparing material
assistance for dispatch through neutral relief channels, such as the ICRC, to the
prisoners of war ofits own nationality held by the enemy; and, more relevandy,
it will be one which is permitted to and does provide material assistance to enemy
prisoners of war held in the territory of its own nation. 28 It is, however, almost
inconceivable that an organization which is established and based in ~he territory
of one belligerent will be permitted to function in the territory of an opposing
belligerent, no matter how impartial and humanitarian its reputation and its
operations.29 Wartime public opinion alone would be a sufficiendy powerful
force to prevent an "enemy" organization from functioning freely in the territory
of the other side-except under the most unusual circumstances.3D
The meaning of the term "humanitarian" is considerably less controversial
and its application presents far fewer problems. As stated by the ICRC in the
excerpts quoted above, "humanitarian" denotes "concerned with the condition
of man, considered solely as a human being." In the context of the prisoner of
war, a "humanitarian organization" is one which has the objective of protecting
and improving the welfare ofthe prisoner ofwar and the conditions under which
he exists. Certainly, this is, and has long been, a major objective of the ICRC,
and, as we have seen, the ICRC serves as a model for identifying the
organizations which come within the meaning of Article 9 of the 1949
Convention.
Finally, the entity seeking to bring itself within that provision-or which one
of the belligerents seeks to bring within that provision-must be an
"organization" and as such it must have some institutional, operational, and
functional resemblance to the ICRC. An individual does not qualify.31 A small,
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ad hoc loose-knit group consisting of individuals who have joined together for
a specific and limited purpose and which is obviously destined to have a limited
life span does not qualify. There must be some institutional basis, some
operational experience and tradition, which clearly establishes it as an
organization that is both impartial and humanitarian?2 An established religious
organization could probably qualify institutionally even though it had not been
previously engaged in prisoner-of-war welfare activities. A national Red Cross
Society could probably qualify institutionally as could an organization which has
operated in the field ofrelieffrom natural disasters. An international organization,
such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States,33 or an
agency thereof, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the OAS
Council, could probably qualify institutionally. The possibilities are almost
limidess.
One additional facet of the designation of "impartial humanitarian
organizations" requires mention. Article 9 of the 1949 Convention makes the
activities of the ICRC or of any other impartial humanitarian organization
"subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned.,,34 In the debate
on the proposed amendment to the draft article which contemplated the
activities of impartial humanitarian organizations other than the ICRC,35 the
representative of France pointed out that "the activities of humanitarian bodies
were always subordinated to approval by Parties to the conflict. ,,36 The provision
of the 1949 Convention has been interpreted, and properly so, as requiring the
consent of all the Parties "upon which the possibility of carrying out the action
contemplated depends. ,,37 This is why it is inconceivable that even a universally
recognized humanitarian organization, if established and based in the territory
38
of one belligerent, would be able to function in the territory of the other.
An organization obviously cannot function if it does not have the permission
and approval of the sovereign of the territory in which it proposes to operate
(normally, this would be the Detaining Power); it legally cannot, and certainly
should not, function if it does not also have the permission and approval of the
other sovereign concerned (normally, this would be the Power of Origin)?9
To summarize:
(1.) An adequate legal basis exists in international law for the release and
repatriation of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of war during the course of
hostilities (Article 109(2)).
(2.) While the legal basis for such action contemplates a consensual
arrangement, the 1949 Convention not only permits but encourages unilateral
action which is more favorable to the prisoners of war than is required by the
Convention itself (Article 6(2)).
(3.) Bilateral release and repatriation of longtime, able-bodied prisoners of
war during the course of hostilities, as provided in the 1949 Convention (Article
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109(2)), is actually a return to the historic procedure of exchange with the added
limitation against the further use of the repatriated prisoners of war" on active
military service" (Article 117).
(4.) Either the International Committee of the Red Cross or "any other
impartial humanitarian organization" may perform humanitarian activities for
the welfare of prisoners of war provided that the appropriate Parties to the
conflict give their consent (Article 9).
(5.) An "impartial humanitarian organization" within the meaning ofArticle
9 of the 1949 Convention is one which is unbiased and unprejudiced, fair and
equitable to both Parties concerned, one which neither by act nor by statement
gives any indication that it prefers one side over the other; one which has the
humanitarian objective of protecting and improving the welfare of the prisoners
of war and the conditions under which they exist in their status as captives; and
one which is truly an "organization," a status measured, in the final analysis, by
its institutional, operational, and functional resemblance to the ICRC.

III
From the foregoing general discussion of the legal aspects of the release and
repartriation during hostilities oflongtime, able-bodied prisoners ofwar through
the intervention of humanitarian organizations, it is obvious that Professor Falk.
and I are in substantial agreement on the merit of such releases and repatriations
from a humanitarian point of view. He suggests the need for "flexible"
interpretation, or, alternativel4'6 revision of the 1949 Convention in order to
accomplish his basic purpose. This is unnecessary because the provisions of
Article 109(2) ofthe 1949 Convention specifically cover exacdy the contingency
with which he is concerned,41 thereby making "flexible"" interpretation or
revision unnecessary.
We part company completely when he attempts to enlarge the scope of the
term "impartial humanitarian organization" so as to bring within its ambit a
group such as the self-styled "Committee ofLiaison with Families ofServicemen
Detained in North Vietnam,,42 (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee of
Liaison") the members of which were far more concerned with anti-war
propaganda than with the welfare of prisoners of war. 43 The Committee of
Liaison was anything but "impartial"; it was more strongly motivated by political
than by humanitarian considerations; and its existence as an "organization"
within the meaning of the 1949 Convention was, at the very least, debatable.
To put the matter in proper perspective, it will be helpful to summarize briefly
the events which are the basis for the legal thesis with which we are dealing.
44
The process really began in October-November 1967 when the Viet Cong
released three captured American soldiers in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to
Thomas E. Hayden, an American identified by the press as being the
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45
representative of "anti-war groups" in the United States. Then in February
1968 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) released three American
pilots in Hanoi to the Rev. Daniel Berrigan and Howard Zinn, also identified
.
I 'm
.
0 f " ann-war
groups. ,,46 Sorne month
sater,
by th e press as representanves
July-August 1968, the DRV released three more American pilots in Hanoi, this
time to Mrs. Robert Scheer, Vernon Grizzard, and Stuart Meacham, once again
identified by the press as representatives of "anti-war" groups.47 In August 1969
the DRV released three American servicemen in Hanoi, this time to Rennard
C. Davis and David Dellinger, who were identified as representing the "National
Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam.'.48 Finally, in September
1972, there occurred the release of three American pilots in Hanoi to Mrs. Cora
Weiss, David Dellinger, Professor Falk et al. 49 Thus, the DRV made the first
release of three captured American servicemen in February 1968; the second in
August 1968; the third in August 1969; and the fourth and last in October 1972.
The first two of these releases were made to well-known anti-war individuals;
the latter two were made to two different anti-war groups. Each was attended
with great publicity over an extended period of time. Each involved the release
of only a token number of prisoners of war. Each involved prisoners of war who
could only have been selected for release for reasons other than their physical
condition or length of confinement, the grounds mentioned in the 1949
Convention for releases and repatriations during the course of hostilities. 50
The cablegram sent by the "escort group" to the President of the United
States from Hanoi51 (which was, perhaps not unexpectedly, immediately
broadcast by Hanoi radio) displayed either remarkable presumption, remarkable
ignorance, or remarkable naivete. 52 The four "guidelines" laid down for the
benefit of the U. S. Government by the Committee ofLiaison warrant individual
comment, particularly in the light of the claim being advanced that the
Committee of Liaison was an "impartial humanitarian organization."
The first paragraph of the cablegram demanded that the three prisoners of
war released by the DRV to the Committee of Liaison for repatriation to the
United States "shall proceed home with us and representatives of their families
in civilian aircraft." The DRV could have made a case for insisting upon the
use of civilian aircraft up to the territorial limits of the United States; but that it
would omit such a major requirement from its public statement, and then
privately so advise the members of the escort groups seems, to say the least, rather
odd. 53 On the other hand, if the use of civil aircraft and the designation of
authorized fellow passengers was a condition asserted on the initiative of the
escort group, the group demonstrated that it, and the Committee of Liaison
which it represented, were anything but "impartial." Moreover, desEite the
obvious mental reservations displayed by members of the escort group, 4 it is a
universal rule of military law that upon his departure from the territory and
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control of the enemy (whether by release, escape, or any other method), a
prisoner of war has the duty to report at once to the first available authorities of
his country. Members of anti-war groups frequendy display a singular inability
to recognize that the relationship between a member of the military service and
the military authorities has evolved over the centuries as a result of the dictates
of necessity and differs considerably from the relationship between a civilian and
the civilian authorities.
The second paragraph of the cablegram called for the granting of a 30-day
"furlough" to the three prisoners of war being released and repatriated. 55 How
such a completely internal, administrative matter could possibly have been
deemed to be within the purview of either the DRV or of an "impartial
humanitarian organization" is exceedingly difficult to perceive. 56 It was j~st
about as much the business of either the DRV or the Committee of Liaison as
it would have been to lay down a condition that the men were to receive
automatic promotions or to be entided to additional pay for the period during
which they had been prisoners of war. The members of the escort group seem
to have labored under the impression that their first contact (except for
Dellinger) with the problem of returned prisoners of war offered a subde
occasion to educate the military services about the process of repatriation. They
were apparendy unmindful of the fact that thousands of prisoners of war had
been repatriated by the armed forces after World War II and the Korean War. 57
The third paragraph of the cablegram demanded a "complete medical
checkup at the hospital of their choice, civilian or military." Once again the
Committee of Liaison pronounced itself on an internal, administrative matter
in an area in which the military services have had far more experience than the
members of the escort group. The members of the Committee again
demonstrated an unwillingness to accept the fact that the three prisoners of war
continued to be members of the military service, subject to military control and
discipline, and were not just civilian members of the general public and
"proteges" of the Committee of Liaison. Moreover, despite the demand for a
medical checkup in a hospital made in the cablegram, the escort group later
apparendy realized that this would completely remove their "proteges" from
their control and, as they approached the United States, their medical judgment
changed. "[I]t was clear to the escort group ... that there was no immediate
need for medical surveillance. ,,58 However, once they were back in the United
States they had to concede that "the pilots preferred, or at least were unwilling
to contest, the Government's insistence on a medical checkup under military
.
,,59
auspIces.
The fourth paragraph of the cablegram prescribed that the three men being
repatriated "shall do nothing further to promote the American war effort in
Indochina." As we have seen, Article 117 of the 1949 Convention contains an
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ambiguous prohibition against a repatriated prisoner of war's being "employed
on active military service.,,60 Like the United States, the ICRe interprets this
to prohibit taking part "in armed operations against the former Detaining Power
or its allies. ,,61 Certainly, any reasonable interpretation of Article 117 is far from
the broad ban which the "impartial," anti-war Committee of Liaison sought to
.
62
Impose.
The fact that the Committee of Liaison opposed U. S. participation in the
hostilities in Vietnam is apparently considered one of the more decisive
arguments in establishing both its "impartiality" and its "humanitarianism. ,,63
Conversely, it is at least implied that support of U. S. participation in the
hostilities in Vietnam establishes a lack of "impartiality" and "humanitarianism."
Thus, the "National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in
Southeast Asia," an organization all of whose members were relatives of
servicemen either known to be prisoners of war or missing in action and whose
goal was "to achieve better treatment for Americans held captive and to learn
the status of those missing in action, ,,64 is dismissed as being one of the "groups
that also proclaim their humanitarian purposes, despite their commitment to
Mr. Nixon's war policies.,,65 While there is merit to the conclusion that the
"National League" did not qualify as an "impartial humanitarian organization"
within the meaning of Article 9 of the 1949 Convention, this is not because of
its failure to oppose U.S. participation in the Vietnamese conflict, but because,
as in the case of the Committee of Liaison, there is no basis for concluding that
it was the type of organization envisaged by the draftsmen of the 1949
Convention.
The failure of the U.S. Government to oppose Dellinger's application for
leave to travel with the escort group when he was free on bail pending an appeal
is construed as evidence of an implied consent by the United States to the
activities of the Committee of Liaison. 66 The fact that the U.S. Government
did not "interfere with its activities,,,67 or "make an objection" to the
Committee,68 and that "the North Vietnamese initiative was not repudiated,,,69
are also cited as evidence that the United States agreed to and concurred in the
. . . 0 f t h e C ommlttee
.
.
actIVItIes
0 fL'la1Son
an d th at ".It was a consensual process. ,,70
In other words, it is contended that the failure of the U.S. Government to
interfere with and to prevent the repatriation in 1972, just as it had taken no
action to interfere with or prevent the earlier repatriations, constituted a legal
acceptance of the Committee of Liaison as an "impartial humanitarian
. . ,,71 That contentIon
. d oes not even appear to warrant diSCUSSlon.
.
orgaruzatIon.
The argument advanced with respect to the proper interpretation of Articles
9 and 10 of the 1949 Convention is also without validity. Despite the fact that
Article 9 is so specific in requiring the consent ofboth Parties to an armed conflict
before the ICRC or an impartial humanitarian organization may undertake
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activities for the protection or relief of prisoners of war, 72 the argument is made
that the language of both Articles 9 and 10 is "ambiguous with regard to whether
the belligerent ~elligerents?] must agree to the designation of a humanitarian
organization"? and the conclusion is reached that it is "most reasonable" to
interpret Article 10(2) "as giving the Detaining Power, North Vietnam, the
capacity to deal with an organization like the Committee ofLiaison.,,74
The DRV is at least a de facto state and its "capacity to deal" with the
Committee of Liaison, or any other group, cannot be doubted; but to use this
circumstance to establish that the Committee of Liaison is, therefore, an
"impartial humanitarian organization" which may be unilaterally designated by
the DRVasa substitute for the Protecting Power is quite another matter. The
attempt to attain this result is, in effect, based upon the following reasoning:
Article 10(2) of the 1949 Convention provides that if there is no Protecting
Power and if no organization offering all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy
to perform the duties of the Protecting Power has been designated to perform
those duties under Article 10(1), "the Detaining Power shall request a neutral
State, or such an organization, to undertake the functions" of the Protecting
Power. In acceding to the 1949 Convention, the DRV made a reservation to
Article 10 stating that it would not "recognize as legal" such a request by the
Detaining Power "unless the re~uest has been approved by the State upon which
the prisoners of war depend.,,7 A substantially similar reservation to Article 10
had been made by the USSR and the Soviet bloc countries upon signing the
Convention in 1949 and in their subsequent ratifications?6 The reason given
by the USSR for the reservation was the belief that "the Government of the
country to which the protected persons belong [cannot be prevented] from
taking part in the choice of the substitute for the Protecting Power.,,77 In
recommending that the Senate give its advice and consent to the ratification of
the 1949 Convention by the United States, the Department of State advised the
Senate ofits opposition to the USSR and similar reservations. 78 This opposition,
according to Falk,
seems to confirm the United States view that the Detaining Power had the
capacity, even the duty, to designate an impartial humanitarian organization and
that such designation would be determinative at least in the absence of objection
from the country whose men are detained that the organization is not "impartial"
or not "humanitarian.,,79
Thus, based upon the DRV reservation to Article 10 of the 1949 Convention
and the earlier stated objection of the Department of State to the DRV-type
reservation to that article, the conclusion is reached that a Detaining Power may
unilaterally designate an "impartial humanitarian organization" to perform
functions with respect to prisoners of war.
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In the first place, it must be borne in mind that Article 10 deals, not with the
activities of the "impartial humanitarian organization" referred to in Article 9,
but with the activities of Protecting Powers and of "substitutes" for Protecting
Powers. It seems incredible that the contention would be made that the
Committee of Liaison, a small group of completely inexperienced individuals,
whose only common thread was opposition to U.S. participation in the hostilities
in Vietnam, could possibly qualify as an organization "offering guarantees of
impartiality and efficacy to perform the duties ofthe Protecting Power,"-which
are the requirements set forth in Article 10(1) for an organization that may be
designated under Article 10(2).
In the second place, the DRV, like the USSR and the Soviet bloc countries
at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, made its reservation to Article 10 because
it considered that the article improperly reduced the right of the Power of Origin
to participate in the selection ofa substitute for the Protecting Power. Inasmuch
as the DRV became a Party to the 1949 Convention only on the condition that
no neutral state or humanitarian organization could be designated by a Detaining
Power to act as a substitute for the Protecting Power without the consent of the
Power of Origin, it is certainly inverse reasoning to claim that this established
the right of the DRV acti~ as a Detaining Power, unilaterally so to designate
the Committee ofLiaison, 8 without the consent of the United States, the Power
of Origin.
In the third place, instead of referring to the suggestion made in a letter written
by Secretary Dulles to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning the
attitude which the United States should take with respect to the Soviet bloc
.
81.It wo uld h ave b een more appropnate
.
..
reservat:1ons,
to refcer to th e pOSlt:10n
actually and officially taken by the United States in connection with ratification
of the 1949 Convention:
Rejecting the reservations which States have made with respect to the Geneva
Convention relative to the treatlnent ofprisoners ofwar, the United States accepts
treaty relations with all parties to that Convention, except as to the changes
proposed by such reservations. 82
In other words, while the United States has treaty relations with any state which
has ratified or acceded to the 1949 Convention with a reservation to Article 10,
those treaty relations are subject to the changes made by the reservation, which
means that neither the United States nor the reserving state, when acting as a Detaining
Power, may designate a neutral Power or a humanitarian organization as a
substitute for the Protecting Power without the approval of the Power of
.. 83
O ngm.
One basic question remains. Why did they do it? Why did the North
Vietnamese unilaterally release these randomly-selected, token-size groups of
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prisoners of war for repatriation? Were the North Vietnamese more
humanitarian-minded than the belligerents of World War I? Of World War II?
Of Korea? Were they inspired to do what they did because of empathy for the
men released and repatriated? All of these questions carry their own negative
responses. 84
The Vietnam War was unlike past conflicts. Previous wars had not seen the
establishment and proliferation of anti-war groups which functioned openly,
seeking publicity that was not always easy for them to obtain. 85 The release of
token numbers of prisoners of war to these groups for repatriation at rather
lengthy intervals served, on each occasion, as a major propaganda device, one
which for a number of days gave the North Vietnamese and the Earticular
anti-war group large-scale newspaper, television, and radio coverage. 8 Had the
releases been purely humanitarian in nature, the prisoners of war selected for
release would have been those who were the most seriously wounded or sick,
or those who had been the longest in prisoner-of-war status; but neither of these
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The significance for the future of what transpired in the concluding months
ofAmerican participation in the war in Vietnam is not great. In an all-out armed
conflict, one which is a "war" both under international law and in an American
constitutional sense, private repatriations by civilians will probably not be
practical, because the members of the antiwar group in any belligerent country
participating in such an event would undoubtedly find themselves spending at
least the balance of the period of hostilities in close confinement after having
been tried and convicted of treason or of communicating with the enemy.
Second, as a practical matter, with the limitations which would exist on wartime
travel, particularly across international borders, it would probably be all but
impossible for an "escort group" to accomplish its function. Third, and most
important, with the close censorship of the news media which is maintained
during wartime, there would be litde or no propaganda value in releasing
token-sized groups of prisoners of war for repatriation as the Power of Origin
could completely control the amount ofpublicity, ifany, which the event would
be allowed within its territory, the place where the impact of the propaganda is
actually desired. Without the publicity which releases and repatriations are
designed to generate, the motive for such action by a belligerent withers on the
vme.
In conclusion, while there are both legal and humanitarian bases for the release
and repatriation, or internment in neutral countries, during the course of
hostilities oflongtime, able-bodied prisoners ofwar, this highly laudable purpose
can best be accomplished through resort to the established and recognized
facilities of the Protecting Power and the International Committee of the Red
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Cross, rather than through the use of partisan, ad hoc groups which have
extremely limited public acceptance and recognition.
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